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Salt Lake County, et al. 
N A T U R E OF T H E CASE 
This is an action attacking the zone classification 
by Salt Lake County of appellants' property located 
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in the canyons east of the Salt Lake Valley. The law-
suit is divided into four causes of action. The first 
alleges that the zoning classification constitutes a taking 
without compensation. The second alleges a conspiracy 
among numerous County officials to deprive appellants 
of the use of their property. The third is in the form of 
a declaratory action seeking to invalidate zoning class-
ification of appellants' property. The fourth seeks a 
writ of mandamus requiring respondents to issue build-
ing permits to certain of the appellants. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The appellants' First and Second Causes of Action 
were dismissed by the Honorable G. Hal Taylor prior 
to trial. Appellants' Third and Fourth Causes of Ac-
tion were dismissed by the Honorable Stewart M. Han-
son after a six-day trial on the merits. The court held 
the zoning classification of appellants' property was 
reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious and did not 
constitute a taking under the Utah or United States 
Constitution. The court found that appellants had 
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies prior 
to bringing this lawsuit by appealing the decision of 
Salt Lake County not to issue building permits to ap-
pellants to the Salt Lake County Board of Adjust-
ment. The court further found that appellants had not 
met the requirements for a building permit. 
2 
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R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
Respondents seek affirmance of the lower court's 
decision. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
In May of 1971, the Salt Lake County Commis-
sion enacted a temporary regulation which required 
approval of the Salt Lake County Planning Commis-
sion prior to the issuance of a building permit for com-
mercial or industrial developments in the canyons east 
of Salt Lake Valley. Ex. P - l l . This regulation was 
enacted by the Salt Lake County Commission pursuant 
to the power granted the County under Utah Code 
Annotated 17-27-19. Mr. Jerry Barnes, a member of 
the Planning staff for Salt Lake County, testified the 
regulation was put into effect to control development 
in the canyons until studies could be made to develop 
a comprehensive zoning plan for the canyon areas. R-
455. Ex. D-4. 
On November 10,1971 the Salt Lake County Com-
mission zoned the canyons FR-50 pursuant to the ap-
plication and recommendation of the Salt Lake County 
Planning Commission. Ex. P- l , P-9, P-14. The F R 
zoning permits single family dwellings, agriculture and 
accessory uses as permitted uses. Ten other uses are per-
mitted in the F R zone upon the owner of property ob-
taining a conditional use permit from the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission. The conditional uses al-
3 
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lowed in the F R zone include, among others, dwelling 
groups, planned unit developments, commercial and 
private recreation, logging and mineral extraction. Ex. 
D-64, Section 22-9a. The FR-50 classification requires 
a minimum of 50 acres for development. However, a 
single family dwelling may be built on any parcel of 
land under the minimum acreage requirement existing 
at the time the zoning went into effect. Ex. 64, Section 
22-2-2. At the time the FR-50 zoning was implemented 
in November of 1971, the studies with regard to each 
specific piece of property in the canyon were not com-
pleted and the County Commission indicated at that 
time that the zoning would be changed for areas which 
were appropriate for higher density development when 
the canyon studies were completed. Ex. P-14. On 
June 14 of 1972, zoning classification for many areas 
of the canyons was amended. Ex. P-3. 
Appellants are owners of certain patented mining 
claims in the canyon area, particularly Little Cotton-
wood Canyon. On October 1, 1971, certain of the ap-
pellants applied for building permits to build two four-
plex condominiums on their property located in the 
Albion Basin area above the city of Alta in Little Cot-
tonwood Canyon. Ex. P-24, Ex. P-25. These two 
fourplexes were the initial phase of an extensive con-
dominium development in the area. Ex. P-26, R-288-
289. Appellants were not issued a building permit at 
that time for their condominium development because 
they failed to obtain the approval of the Planning Com-
mission for building permits under the temporary regu-
4 
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lations in effect at that time in the canyons and because 
they did not have an adequate water supply acceptable 
to the City-County Board of Health. Finding No. 10. 
In June of 1972, much of appellants' property in the 
Albion Basin area was rezoned from FR-50 to FR-1 . 
Ex. D-66, Ex. P-3. The FR-1 classification requires 
a minimum of one acre for development. 
On March 25, 1973, appellants filed their law-
suit attacking the canyon zoning. 
P O I N T I 
T H E ZONING O R D I N A N C E ZONING 
T H E CANYONS E A S T O F SALT L A K E VAL-
L E Y W A S V A L I D L Y E N A C T E D BY T H E 
SALT L A K E COUNTY COMMISSION. 
Utah Code Annotated 17-27-9 sets forth the pow-
ers and duties of the Planning Commission with regard 
to making a zoning plan for the unincorporated terri-
tory within the County. 
"The county planning commission of any 
county may, and upon the order of the board of 
county commissioners in any county having a 
county planning commission, shall make a zon-
ing plan or plans for zoning all or any part of 
the incorporated territory within such county, in-
cluding both the full text of the zoning resolu-
tion or resolutions and the maps, in representing 
the recomendations of the commission for the 
5 
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regulation by districts or zones of the location, 
heights, bulk, and sizes of buildings and other 
structures, percentage of lot which may be oc-
cupied, the size of lots, courts and other oper 
spaces . . . " 
Section 17-27-10 requires the Planning Commission to 
certify the plan to the County Commission and re-
quires the County Commission to hold a hearing there-
on prior to the adoption of any zoning regulation. 
Under this section notice of such hearing must be pub-
lished four times in a newspaper of general circula-
tion at least 30 days prior to such hearing. Section 
17-27-11 sets forth the manner in which zoning dis-
tricts and regulations are enacted. Section 17-27-14 
grants the power to the county commissioners to amend 
the districts "or any other provisions of the zoning 
resolution." Under this section, prior to such amend-
ment, the Commission must hold a hearing, notice of 
which must be published one time in a newspaper of 
general circulation at least 30 days prior to the time 
of the hearing. 
Originally, zoning in the county was done by 
districts, each district containing a separate text and 
maps. However, since the adoption of the uniform 
zoning ordinance for Salt Lake County in 1966, regu-
lation of location, heights, bulk and size of buildings 
and other structures, etc., has been done by zones. 
A separate text is not enacted for each district. Ex. 
P-63. The uniform zoning ordinance also contains 
general provisions such as a parking provision which 
6 
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the County has applied to all unincorporated territory 
in the county since the adoption of the uniform text. 
Ex. P-63, Section 22-1 through 5; 22-31, 22-32 R-233. 
The County has taken the position that since the uniform 
ordinance applies to all unincorporated territory in Salt 
Lake County, zoning of additional territory within the 
unincorporated areas of the county is not original zon-
ing but rather, is an amendment to the existing text 
and ordinance and is covered by the notice requirements 
of 17-27-14 and not by the requirements of 17-27-10. 
This is the method followed by the County in enacting 
the canyon zoning and much of the zoning elsewhere 
in the County. R-397-404. The zoning plan certified 
to the County Commission by the Planning Commis-
sion is contained in the text and map for the F i t zoning 
in the canyons and meets the requirements of Utah 
Code Annotated 17-27-9 for a zoning plan. Damick v. 
Planning and Zoning Comm., 256 A.2d 428 (1969); 
Hawkins v. City of Richmond, 286 N.E.2d 682 (1972); 
Higginbotham v. City of the Village, 361 P.2d 191 
(Okla. 1961); Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 
Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964). 
The objection raised by appellants is that the notice 
of the hearing was published only once instead of four 
times. This objection is not based on any claim of preju-
dice against the appellants or lack of opportunity to be 
heard. Mr. Marvin Melville, who represented appellants 
in this action, testified that all of the appellants had ac-
tual notce of the hearings on the canyon zoning. R-292, 
Finding of Fact No. 7. Mr. Knowlton and Mr. Mel-
• 7 . . v. 
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ville were both present and participated in the hearing 
on the canyon zoning held on October 6, 1971, for which 
appellants claim the notice requirements were not met. 
Ex. P-14. Four to five hundred people attended this 
hearing. Ex. P-6. Nowhere during that hearing or 
in the trial below did appellants claim any prejudice 
or lack of opportunity to be heard on the basis of the 
notice requirements followed by the County. 
In Naylor v. Salt Lake City, 17 U.2d 300, 410 
P.2d 764 (1966), this court rejected an attack on a 
zoning ordinance on the grounds of improper notice 
under Utah Code Annotated 10-9-5 where the plain-
tiffs had actual notice and participated in the zoning 
hearing. The court noted that the plaintiffs had suf-
fered no disadvantage because of having actual notice 
of the hearing. See also Salt Lake County v. Public 
Service Commission, 29 U.2d 386, 510 P2d 923 (1973). 
The Naylor case is consistent with law in other 
jurisdictions. In Dolomite Products Company v. Kip-
ers, 241 N.Y. Supp. 2d 748, 752, (1963), the court 
rejected plaintiffs' attack on the insufficiency of the 
hearing notice where plaintiffs had actual notice of the 
zoning hearing and participated in it. The court stated: 
"The purpose of the requirement for publica-
tion of the notices is to advise those who may 
have had any interest in, and desire to be heard 
upon, the proposed administrative action. It 
would seem that, as to those who had actual 
' notice of the hearing, the purpose of the statute 
requiring publication, would have been served. 
$ 
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I t has been held that such notice for appear-
ance and participation in the hearing would con-
stitute a waiver of any and all error in giving 
not ice. . ." 
A similar result was reached in the case of Ridge-
wood Land Company vs. Simmons, 137 So.2d 532 
(Miss. 1962), where plaintiffs, who had actual notice 
of and attended the hearing, attacked the zoning ord-
inance on the grounds that the legal description in the 
notice was incorrect. The court stated: 
" 'One who has received notice of a hearing 
and actually attends waives objection to insuf-
ficiency of the notice because the notice has 
achieved its purpose.' " 
Numerous other courts have ruled to the same effect. 
Clark v. Wolman, 243 Md. 597, 221 A.2d 687 (1966); 
Re Request for Rezoning by Yeany, 120 Ohio App. 20, 
200 N.E.2d 813 (1963); Malley v. Clay County Zon-
ing Commission, 225 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1969); Hilton v. 
Board of Supervisors, 7 Cal. App. 3rd 708, 86 Cal 
Rptr. 754 (1970). 
Appellants also attack the validity of the canyon 
zoning on several other statutory grounds. None of 
these allegations were specifically raised by appellants 
in their complaint, their motion for summary judgment, 
or their amended complaint during trial. Utah Code 
Annotated 17-27-11, the requirements of which appel-
lants allege the County did not comply with in enacting 
the canyon zoning, grants to the County Commission 
' : " • ' • ' • 9 
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the power to create zoning districts. No procedure or 
method is set forth as to how such districts must be 
created by the County Commissioners as they are in 
Utah Code Annotated 17-27-17 which provides for 
creation of districts by petition. The County Com-
mission did create the Big Cottonwood, Little Cot-
tonwood, Parley's and Millcreek Planning District on 
the same date the FR-50 zoning was enacted for the 
District. Ex. P- l . The County Commission appointed 
commissioners for the district. R-419. If the County 
erred in creating districts by this method, no prejudice 
resulted to appellants. While most procedural require-
ments are regarded as mandatory, most courts will 
uphold a zoning ordinance enacted where the legisla-
tive procedures which substantially, if not literally, 
comply with the statutory prescription. Naylor v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., supra; Mulligan v. New Brunswick, 
83 N.J . Super 185, 199 A.2d 82 (1964). This is es-
pecially true when no prejudice resulted from the error. 
Brown v. Shelby, 360 Mich. 299, 103 N.W.2d 612 
(1960). In any event, zoning of the County had been 
made county wide by the time of trial and districts were 
therefore no longer required. R-521. 
Appellants also attack the canyon zoning on the 
grounds that zoning ordinances have not been filed with 
the County Recorder's Office and the maps have not 
been filed with the Clerk's Office in the past pursuant 
to the requirements in Utah Code Annotated 17-27-24. 
The language and the purpose of this statute do not sup-
port appellants' contention that failure to comply with 
10 
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it's provisions affects the validity of the ordinance. The 
obvious purpose of this statute is to make the ordinances 
available to the public. Appellants do not allege they 
were not aware of the canyon zoning or did not have 
an access to the ordinance and in fact, all zoning or-
dinances are available to the public at the Planning 
Commission. Nowhere does the statute specifically re-
quire the filing of a zoning ordinance as a prerequisite 
to its effectiveness, nor does it state a time limit in 
which this must be done. The requirement in Section 
17-27-24 that the county commission "shall" file copies 
of the ordinances is analogous to the requirement in 
Section 17-27-4 that the planning commission "shall" 
make a master plan of the county. The language in 
neither section specially states compliance with its re-
quirements are a prerequisite to the validity of zoning 
ordinances. This court has specifically held that failure 
of the planning commission to make a master plan does 
not affect the validity of ordinances. Gayland v. Salt 
Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961). 
Because Utah Code Annotated 17-27-24 does not 
require that its provisions be met by the county before 
zoning ordinances became effective or invalidate ordi-
nances for failure of the county to meet it requirements, 
respondents submit the court should not read this require-
ment into the statute, the effect of which would be to 
strike down all of the zoning in Salt Lake County. 
Courts in other jurisdictions having similar statutes re-
quiring that zoning ordinances be filed with clerks or in 
the recorder's office have held that failure to comply 
11 
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with such requirements does not invalidate a zoning ordi-
nance. Frost v. Village of Hilshire Village, 403 S.W.2d 
836 (Texas 1966); DeLand v. City of Tulsa, 2Q F.2d 
640 (8th Cir. 1928) ; Wright v. DeFatta, 142 So.2d 489, 
Aff. 152 So.2d 10 (La. 1962), 
P O I N T I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT C O R R E C T L Y 
F O U N D T H E ZONING P L A N F O R A P P E L -
L A N T S ' CANYON P R O P E R T Y IS REASON-
A B L E A N D NOT A R B I T R A R Y OR CAPRI-
CIOUS. 
Under Utah Code Annotated 17-27-13, zoning 
regulations may be enacted by counties "for the pur-
pose of promoting the health, safety, morals, conveni-
ence, order, prosperity or welfare of the present and 
future inhabitants of the state of Utah . . ." This 
Court has held that the exercise of the zoning power is 
a legislative function and the wisdom of a zoning plan 
is a matter which lies in the discretion of the author-
ities and may be set aside by the court only if confis-
catory, discriminatory or arbitrary. Naylor v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., supra; Dowse v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953); Phi Kappa 
lota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 
P.2d 177 (1949). The lower court, after hearing evi-
dence on the canyon zoning for six days, found the 
zoning classification of appellants' property was not 
12 
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arbitrary or capricious but rather, was based on con-
siderations of fire and police protection, access to prop-
erty, avalanche protection, protection of the watershed, 
availability of water and sewer, soil and slope protection, 
landslide dangers, visual considerations, acknowledg-
ment of existing facilities and slope. R-37, Finding 
No. 10. 
The evidence shows that the County has spent 
thousands of dollars and many man hours to gather in-
formation and facts for the purpose of developing a 
proper zoning plan for the use and protection of the 
canyons. Topographical studies were made by the staff 
of the Planning Commission of all privately owned 
property in the canyons prior to the zoning amend-
ments enacted in June of 1972. R-448-449. Numerous 
public agencies and other sources were contacted by and 
supplied information to the staff of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission which prepared the zon-
ing plan for the canyons. R-449. The Salt Lake City 
Water Department supplied information concerning 
culinary water supply from Little Cottonwood Canyon 
which supplies a major percentage of the culinary water 
supply for Salt Lake City Water Department. R-450. 
Charles Wilson of the Salt Lake City Water Depart-
ment, representing Mayor Gain, appeared at the hear-
ings on the canyon zoning and submitted a statement 
that Salt Lake City supported the canyon zoning plan 
as the extraterritorial jurisdiction of Salt Lake City 
could not alone solve the watershed problem, Ex. P-6. 
Since Salt Lake City is a major supplier of culinary 
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water to the residents of Salt Lake County located out-
side of Salt Lake City, (R-384) there can be no question 
that protection of this watershed relates to the health 
arid welfare of the residents of Salt Lake County. 
Dr. David W. Eckhoff, Associate Professor of Civil 
Engineering at the University of Utah, testified that the 
University's Department of Civil Engineering con-
ducted a study, in which he participated, to deter-
mine the effect of the continued increased use of Little 
Cottonwood Canyon on the water supply from Little 
Cottonwood Canyon. Ex. D-90, R-673-685. The study 
showed that the number of coliform in the water has 
been doubling since 1967 and if this trend continued 
at the same rate, the water would exceed the maximum 
coliform acceptable by the U.S. Public Health Service 
for raw water supply by 1978. The study also showed 
a direct relationship between land use intensity and 
coliform count in the water. Dr. Eckhoff concluded 
that only drastic prohibition of further human use of 
the canyons could alter this trend. R-681. However, 
the day usage of the canyon has increased from 165,000 
in 1967 to 282,1000 in 1971. Ex. 66, p. 27. 
.The U.S. Forest Service supplied information con-
cerning avalanches and topography of the canyons. 
R-449. Much of Little Cottonwood Canyon, is unde-
velopable because of soil erosion hazards, vegetation 
problems, avalanche danger, and extreme slopes. Ex. 
D-66, p. 45, p. 51, p. 53. A composite map in the 
Master Plan shows very little of the land is suitable for 
development. Ex. D-66, p. 69. 
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The town of Alta, which is located immediately 
below the Albion Basin, was contacted to determine its 
zoning plan. All of Alta, except the present lodge 
developments, are zoned FR-IOO, which requires 100 
acres for single family dwellings and is more restrictive 
than any canyon zoning in Salt Lake County. R-450. 
The Soil Conservation Service, the City-County Health 
.Department and the State of Utah also were contacted 
and furnished information. -
Mr. Julian Thomas, an expert in avalanches and 
forest land appraisal formerly employed by the Forest 
Service as the District Ranger for the Wasatch Front 
area, testified as to the developability of each of ap-
pellants' 40 parcels of land involved in this lawsuit. 
Exhibit D-86, which is a topographical map on which 
all of appellants' parcels of land in the canyons are 
located, makes it clear nearly all of their land is liter-
ally located on mountaintops. For instance, Mr. Mel-
ville admitted that Parcel 2 contains a vertical drop 
of almost 1,600 feet. R-760. Mr. Thomas testified that 
with the exception of three parcels of land in the Albion 
Basin, none of the land is presently developable be-
cause of lack of water, access, steepness of the terrain 
and avalanche danger. R-589-594. He further testified 
that much of the land is so steep that it would actually 
take a rock climber to go over it. R-589. A summary 
of this testimony is contained in Exhibit D-87 where 
Mr. Thomas concludes only 2 per cent of the land is 
developable at all. 
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The evidence introduced by the County shows 
numerous reasons justifying the zoning of appellants' 
property in the Albion Basin area for single family 
recreation use and not commercial or high density use 
which is allowed in limited areas further down the can-
yon. Mr. Thomas testified that the avalanche danger 
was greater in the Albion Basin area than in the Snow-
bird area. When the canyon zoning was being con-
sidered the sewer extended to the Snowbird area but 
there were no plans to extend the sewer into the Albion 
Basin area. R-458. In fact, the Forest Service denied 
appellants' application to extend the sewer over Fed-
eral lands into the Albion Basin area. Ex. D-74. Mr. 
Thomas testified the road to the Albion Basin is owned 
by the Forest Service and is only left open in the 
summer months. R-622. A ski run crosses the road in 
the winter and so it would be very difficult to open it 
in the winter. R-572. Mr. Melville testified the only 
winter access into the Albion Basin is by snowmobile or 
by using the ski lift and hiking cross-country. R-265. 
This lack of winter access could cause problems of fire 
and police protection if the property were developed 
commercially. R-705. Appellants' property in the Al-
bion Basin is adjacent to a public campground which 
the staff of the Planning Commission felt was not com-
patible with commercial development. R-460, R-706. 
Finally, the visual impact of high density development 
in the Albion Basin area would be much greater than 
in the Snowbird area because the Snowbird area is 
down in the canyon. 
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The present zoning of appellants' property in Little 
Cottonwood Canyon is consistent with the master plan 
for the area which was prepared by Eckbo, Dean, Austin 
and Williams, a land consulting firm from San Fran-
cisco, at the expense of over $19,000 to the County. Ex. 
D-66, R-497. This plan calli for limited development in 
the Albion Basin area. Ex. D-66, p. 6. Mr. Clayne 
Ricks, Director of the Planning staff for the County, 
testified that further studies have been contracted by 
the County in the areas of transportation, land use 
capacity and economics for the canyons. R-706. 
Zoning in the canyons has not been done haphaz-
ardly or arbitrarily. Rather, it is a continuing process 
based on scientific studies gathered by County plan-
ners, other government agencies and professional con-
sultants. I t is hard to imagine how the County could 
have been more thorough in planning for proper use 
of land in the canyons. The evidence from these studies 
makes it apparent that if we are to protect the natural 
resources in our canyons, development must be re-
stricted and controlled. The present zoning plan for 
the canyon is designed to protect natural resources in 
the canyons while at the same time allowing limited de-
velopment of private property in the canyons. Respond-
ents would submit that the evidence fully supports the 
lower court's finding that this is a reasonable zoning 
plan for our canyons. ._.. ; ^ ^ -
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P O I N T I I I 
T H E L O W E R COURT C O R R E C T L Y 
H E L D T H A T T H E CANYON Z O N I N G D O E S 
NOT C O N S T I T U T E A T A K I N G O F A P P E L -
L A N T S ' P R O P E R T Y . 
The very purpose of zoning is to limit and control 
the uses of property. The fact that a zoning ordinance 
denies a property owner the highest and best use of 
his land does not make it unconstitutional. Chevron 
Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 22 U.2d 143, 449 P.2d 989 
(1969); Board of County Commissioners v. Kay, 240 
Md. 690, 215 A.2d 206 (1965); Bichmark Bealty Co. 
v. WUttlif, 226 Md. 273,173 A.2d 196 (1961); Appeal 
of Ligget, 291 Pa. 109, 139 A. 619 (1927); Bidgewood 
Land Co. v. Moore, 222 So.2d 378 (Miss. 1969); 
Wright v. Littleton, 483 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1971). In the 
latter case the court noted that a zoning ordinance 
which does not allow a landowner to use his property 
in the most profitable manner is not unconstitutional 
since the limitation of use is an essential and funda-
mental purpose of all zoning. 
Likewise, the fact that a zoning ordinance reduces 
the value of a particular parcel of land does not make 
tne ordinance unconstitutional provided the regulation 
bears a reasonable relationship to the health, safety, 
morals and welfare of the community. Leary v. Adams, 
226 A.2d 472, 147 So. 391 (1933); White Lake v. 
Amos, 371 Mich. 693, 124 N.W.2d 803 (1963); Udell 
V. McFadyen, 40 Misc. 2d 265, 243 N.Y.S.2d 156 
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(1963); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery 
County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969); 
Hedrich v. Kane County, 117 111. App.2d 169, 253 
N.E.2d566 (1969). 
I t is clear from the numerous reasons set forth in 
Point I I of respondents' brief that the canyon zoning 
relates to the health, safety, morals and welfare of the 
citizens of this valley and therefore was correctly upheld 
by the court even if appellants had established a substan-
tial reduction in the value of their land. However, based 
upon the testimony of appellants' own expert, the 
lower court found that the evidence did not establish 
a substantial change in value. Appellants' expert testi-
fied as to the value of appellants' property in the Al-
bion Basin before and after the canyon zoning became 
effective in November of 1971. He offered no testi-
mony with regard to the other properties involved in 
the lawsuit. His testimony regarding the property in 
the Albion Basin was based entirely on two sales of 
property which he thought were prior to the enactment 
of the canyon zoning: The first, a sale at $40,000 an 
acre to a Mr. Cahill and the second at the equivalent 
of $37,634 also to Mr. Cahill from a different seller. 
R-301-302. Appellants' appraiser testified there were 
no other comparable sales after the effective date of 
the FR-50 zoning. R-302. On the basis of these two 
sales he testified that in his opinion the land was worth 
$32,000 prior to the zoning and then he estimated the 
value of the land after the zoning. However, the op-
tion agreement on the second sale to Mr. Cahill was 
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exercised in 1972 after the implementation of the FR-
50 zoning and not before as the appraiser had mistak-
enly assumed. Ex. D-100, R-737. Thus, what actually 
happened is Mr. Cahill paid approximately the same 
price for property prior to and after the enactment of 
the FR-50 zoning. On the basis of this testimony the 
lower court found that the appellants had not estab-
lished a substantial reduction in the value of their land 
because of the FR-50 zoning. 
There are numerous cases upholding zoning or-
dinances or denying applications for zoning amend-
ments where the economic effect on the property in-
volved is much more severe than the affect of the can-
yon zoning on appellants' property. 
This Court, in Chevron Oil Company v. Beaver 
County, supra, upheld the refusal of Beaver County 
to rezone from agricultural land worth $20 an acre to 
highway service land worth $10,000 an acre. 
A "forest preserve district" requiring six acre mini-
mum lot sizes in the town of Sanbornton, New Jersey, 
was upheld in Steel Hill Development Inc. v. Town of 
Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972) where many 
of the same considerations for protecting the environ-
ment were involved as are present in our own canyons. 
In that case, the court stated: 
"We recognize as within the general welfare, 
concerns relating to the construction and inte-
gration of hundreds of new homes which would 
have an irreversible effect on the area's ecolog-
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ical balance, destroy scenic values, decrease open 
space, significantly change rural character of this 
small town, put substantial burdens on the town 
for police, fire, sewer and road services . . ." 
„ Another area where courts have weighed the public 
interest in protecting the environment against the al-
legation of taking of property without compensation 
in deciding the validity of zoning ordinances is flood 
plain zoning. These ordinances have been upheld even 
though they place severe restrictions on the use of 
property where property owners were left with a rea-
sonable use of their property and the evidence estab-
lished the zoning related to the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the people. Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 
Cal. App. 3rd 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972) ; Famularo 
v. Board of County Commissioners of Adams County, 
505 P2d 958 (Colo. 1973), Turnpike Realty Co. v. 
Townof'Dedham, 284 NE2d 891,900 (Mass. 1972).In 
the latter case the court upheld a flood plain ordinance 
even though it placed severe restrictions on building on 
plaintiff's property causing a reduction in the value of 
his land from $431,000 to $53,000. The court empha-
sized the dangers to the community from overdevelop-
ment, the same danger which is present in our canyons 
and concerned the County representatives who enacted 
the canyon zoning. 
4
'Although it is clear that the petitioner is sub-
stantially restricted in the use of the land, such 
resrictions must be balanced against the poten-
tial harm to the community from overdevelop-
ment of a flood plain area." 
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Still another area where the courts have upheld 
severe restrictions on the development of land is the area 
of shoreline and wetlands control. A landmark case in 
this area is Candlestick Properties Inc. v. San Francsico 
Bay Conservation and Development Commission, 89 
Gal. Rptr. 897 (1970). In this case the court upheld 
the McAteer-Petris Act under which the San Francisco 
Bay Conservation and Development Commission denied 
a permit to plaintiffs therein to deposit fill on their 
property located on the bay. Plaintiffs alleged that the 
property had no value for any other purpose and alleged 
the taking without compensation. The court noted 
changing conditions and their effect on the environment 
stating: 
"In short, the police power, as such, is not con-
fined within the narrow circumspection of pre-
cedence, resting upon past conditions which do 
not cover and control present day conditions . . . 
that is to say, as a commonwealth develops polit-
ically, economically, and socially, the police 
power will likewise develop, within reason to 
meet the changing conditions." 89 Cal Rptr at 
905 
The court noted the danger to the Bay by allowing 
continued uncontrolled filling. 
"In those sections the legislature has deter-
mined the bay is the most valuable single natural 
resource of the entire region and changes in one 
part of the bay may affect all other parts, that 
the present uncoordinated haphazard manner in 
which the bay is being filled threatens the bay 
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i itself and is therefore enimical to tl 1** welfare of 
both present and future residents of the bay area; 
and that a regional approach is necessary to pro-
tect the public interest in the hay." X'.i CaI H \-\\ 
at 905. 
1 b" ! uii(iaj!i«'iif:ii rule governing all the cast's in-
voking an allegation of a taking is that i.* sustain vich 
an adcg .mon . Hie aggr ieved par ty mu^t -ium that Mu 
enforced restrictions upon MIS property uill preclude 
its use for any purpose to which it is reasonably adapted. 
Famularo v. Board of County Cornrnisdoners of Adams 
County, supra; Fertitta v. Brown, 252 Md. 594, 251 
A.2d 212 (1969):; Phoenix v. Burke, 452 P.2d 722 
(Ariz. 1009); Schour r. Lynhrool\ 25 App. D h . 2d 
Ht: JA\H N.V.S. 2d :>7 7 [ ItMMi). In the ease herein ap-
pellants attempt to show a iaking by claiming that the 
FR-50 does not allow Ihcm to build on any parcels 
under 50 acres; however, this is not true. As appellants 
well known, the zoning ordinance permits a single family 
dwelling on any parcel of land existing at the time a 
zoning ordinance is enacted setting minimum lot sizes 
greater than the size of the existing parcel. Section 22-
2-2, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 1968. 
E x . P-63, R-348. The Planning Commission specific-
ally considered this fact when recommending the pass-
age of the canyon zoning. R-524. This was also stressed 
at-the hearing on the FR-50. Kx J'-M in the u-ea 
where appellants applied t*> build their tv.»» fourplexes, 
which is zoned F R - 1 , they had an approved subdivision 
prior to' the enactment '^ the canyon /miing f,-* ^0 
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lots. Ex. P-43. Under the present canyon zoning ord-
inance appellants may build a single family dwelling 
on each of the 30 lots in the subdivision and a single 
family dwelling on each other parcel of land owned by 
the appellants in the canyon under 50 acres. In fact, 
Mr. Knowlton has built a cabin on a lot less than one 
acre since the enactment of the canyon zoning. R-501. 
In the Albion Basin alone the present canyon zoning 
classification permits approximately 100 single family 
cabins to be built. R-707. 
Appellants in their lawsuit offered no testimony 
that classification of their land for single family resi-
dences would cause them to lose any money they have 
invested in the land. In fact Mr. Melville testified the 
land is old mining claims, some of which was acquired 
at tax sales. R-282. They only tried to show, unsuccess-
fully, that they could earn more money if it were zoned 
in a different manner. This same contention was re-
jected by this court in the Beaver County case. Ob-
viously, there is no question single family recreation 
homes for which appellants' property is zoned, is an 
appropriate use of the property and an economically 
feasible use of the property. 
Appellants' allegations that the zoning of their 
property was a conspiracy among numerous County 
officials and the Forest Service to preserve it for pub-
lic use is not supported by the facts. The zoning of 
appellants' property in the Albion Basin was a small 
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part of a comprehensive zoning plan for all of the can-
yons east of Salt Lake County. When the canyon zon-
ing went into effect, appellants' property was zoned 
i i«.-.yO in the same manner as all other property in the 
canyons. !i. ,*-.:•• • i MJ72, much of appellants' Albion 
Basin property was rezoned (Vtm TH •- : • VH- .J-
though a great deai o* the canyon remain*, o j 'he 
••<• restrictive FR-50. Properties surrounding ap-
i" nants' property are zoned in the same classification as 
is appellants' property. K\ D<>8. There has been no 
different treatment in the zoning of ap;> UanU prop-
erty than :ai rhe zoning o>' any i-f I he properties sur-
rounding their property. The numerous differences be-
tween appellants' property and the limited properties 
zoned for higher density use lower in the canyon have 
been set forth in Point I I . The fact that a hundred 
residences may be built in the Albion Basin alone is 
inconsistent vvith the iheon. thai the County is attempt-
ing to prevent building in the area. 
Commissioner McClurc testified the zoning of ap-
pellants' property was not implemented to allow public 
purchase of the area at a lower price, but rather, as a 
part of comprehensive zoning plan for all of the private 
owned land in the canyons, R.-200-'J0(i, R-445. -1> 
Campbell. l ) i r eb»- "f the Planning Commission in 
1971 testified that nn member of t lv Commission had 
tried to influence the zoning plan they recommended 
!•»>!• ..:i<»rtM>n in the eanvon*-. K-'*-H Mr Thomas from 
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the Forest Service also testified that the Forest Service 
did not try to influence the zoning plan that the County 
adopted. R-611. On the basis of this testimony the 
court found that there was no giant conspiracy among 
the respondents to zone appellants' property in a man-
ner that it could be purchased at a lower price or pre-
served for public use. Finding No. 11. Rather, the 
evidence showed that the public officials implemented 
the canyon zoning to control the development boom 
before irreparable damage was done to the land and 
natural resources in the canyons, both public and private. 
P O I N T IV 
T H E L O W E R COURT C O R R E C T L Y D I S -
M I S S E D A P P E L L A N T S ' F O U R T H CAUSE 
OF ACTION S E E K I N G A B U I L D I N G P E R -
MIT. 
A. Appellants did not meet County requirements for 
a building permit. 
The lower court found that appellants did not 
meet County requirements of the Planning Commission 
and the requirements of the City-County Board of 
Health for a building permit. Finding of Fact No. 
10. This finding is supported by the record. Mr. Hoff-
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man. Hi<i Supervisor of Wate r and Sewage Sanitation 
for HM Citv-County Board of Health, ttstifiVd that 
appellants' oiiginal source of water for the proposed 
condominium development was not adequate because it 
dried up during the
 w i n t e r months and informed ap-
pellants they would have to seek an alternative source. 
K-:*7!»-'i8;J. Mr. Melville admitted at toal th;it -
source was not adequate in HK wmbv. K-^io Ap-
pellants then proposed a second source for the four-
plex condominiums; however, this source was not com-
pleted or approved before the zoning was implemented 
in the canyons. R-281. Although appellants applied 
t«.. Mil County for a building permit for two foir'plex 
eondominiums, Mr. Melville testified this was \h* first 
step in a major condominium development in the .\W n 
Basin area. R-29. Appellants ' building plants reflect 
a development for 11 condominiums consist ing of four 
units each. E x . P-18. liecau.se appellants contem-
plated a major development in the area and because 
M : 5. iff man had certain questions a- to (lie capacity 
*ni-i f'ftvl oi; ti: • watershed *»f qmellanlN* proposed 
iimui tunnel water source, it was referred 1 *> the State 
Engineer for review. R-380-388, This is the same ap-
proach the County took in the Snowbird development 
in the canyons. R-38t>. The fact that the immediate 
development nuiy not ha\e required the approval o, 
the Stal<- in n- v. a\ prevents the Couivh* from seek-
ing the assistance of tlv State wl^vc it i. needed. 
Temporary zoning regulations in effect for the 
canyons at the time appellants applied for their build-
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ing permits required the approval of the Salt Lake 
County Planning Commission for the erection of a 
building structure for "commercial or industrial pur-
poses". Ex. P - l l . However, appellants did not ob-
tain approval of the Planning Commission. Mr. Doug-
las Campbell, former director of the Planning staff, 
testified that the longstanding interpretation of the 
term "commercial" in the temporary zoning regulations 
included multi-unit dwellings as such dwellings are 
generally income producing developments. R-357. Mr. 
Campbell further testified that other persons proposing 
similar developments as the appellants in areas under 
temporary regulations have been required to obtain 
approval of the Planning Commission prior to the issu-
ance of a building permit. R-357. The Snowbird de-
velopment for condominiums obtained Planning Com-
mission approval. R-501, Ex. D-70. The wording and 
purpose of the enabling statute authorizing counties 
to enact temporary zoning regulations support this 
interpretation by County officials. 
Utah Code Annotated 17-27-19 authorizes the 
County to enact temporary zoning regulations requiring 
Planning Commission approval of a structure to be used 
for "business, commercial or industrial purposes". By 
using both the terms "business" and "commercial" in the 
statute, the legislature apparently intended a "commer-
cial" purpose to include more than the building of a 
"business". Development of an eight-unit condominium 
involves sale, lease or rental of some or all of the units 
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and is normally Untight of as a "commercial" venture. 
The purpose of the temporary regulations obviously is 
to control certain types of development while the Plan-
ning Commission is developing a zoning plan for the 
By granting counties ?h> =,#!. -> rMpnre 
P lan t ing Commission approval •! business, coni-
mercial and industrial de\cIopinents" d u i n g thi*- <n-
terim period, the legislature was concerned with the con-
trol of the types of uses which necessarily have1 the m. 4 
impact on an area and thm. which need to be limited as 
to location in a zoning plan. Multi-unit dwellings are 
. \h\< category as they generate addfhonai traffic 
in an area and have an impact on public senicev H ^ 
Respondents would suhmit County officials were correct 
in inquiring appellants to obtain Planning Commission 
: , jM ,*-, ,*-, ,! f^ r Ov*'" "onflnminiiIPV d*M-rlojtm''1,1 
^ \[>pellants failed to exhaust Hir^r administrative 
remedies prior to bringing MI if. 
[ 1 tah Code : \ ni 10 tated 1' ' 5 1953 pi ovides as 
follows i 
" Vppeals to the Hoard of An .u^+ment may be 
MUV, n by any person aggrieved . . . by the decision 
of any administrative officer or agency based up-
on or made in the enforcement of the provision 
of the zoning resolution . . . 
: pon appeals, the Board of Adjustment shall 
have the following powers: I To hear and de-
cide appeals where it is alleged by the* appellant 
that there is any error in any order, requirement 
decision wjiisal nude by any administrative 
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official or agency based on or made in the en-
forcement of the zoning resolution . . . " 
The statute proceeds to delegate to the Board of Ad-
justment the power to promulgate rules of procedure 
describing time limits in which an appeal must be made. 
Salt Lake County Board of Adjustment General Rules 
of Procedures, July 16,1963, No. 3, provides: 
"An appeal taken to the Board of Adjustment 
must be taken within 90 days after the cause of 
action arises or the appeal will not be considered 
by the Board of Adjustment." Ex. D-102. 
In Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Company, 15 
U.2d 305, 308, 392 P.2d 40 (1964), this Court stated: 
'The 90-day limitation of Section 17-27-16 is 
designated to assure speedy appeal to the proper 
tribunal of any aggrievance that a party may 
have who is adversed by a decision of an admin-
istrative agency." 
In that case, which dealt with the issuance of a building 
permit to construct a mobile trailer park, this Court 
ruled that since the aggrieved party had failed to ex-
haust his administrative remedies by appealing the 
adverse decision to the Board of Adjustment within 90 
days after the cause arose, the suit was properly dis-
missed by the lower court for failure of the appellant 
therein to exhaust his administrative remedies. 
In the case herein, appellants were denied a build-
ing permit by Ronald Ivie of the County Building and 
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Zoning Depar tment on the basis thai appellants' pro-
posed condominium fourplexes were "commercial" 
buildings within the meaning of the temporary zoning 
regulations in effect for the canyons at that time and 
needed zoning approval prior to the issuance of the 
permit. R-136. I n addition, the permit w: s denied lie-
cause appellants did not have -u. ide<|uat< wi^cr Mip~ 
ph !f»r the development. This was a decision of an 
i< Moralise official which should have been appealed 
to the Board of Adjiistment pursuant to the mpr••* 
merits of Utah Code Annotated 17-27- in The iouer 
eoun was correct under the authority iA' the Lnnd ease 
in dismissing appellants' Fourth Cause . \ , ? j . ». U% • 
cause of the failure of appellants to do n Tin fact 
thai appellants in their lawsuit also challenge zoning 
ordinances later enacted for the same piece of property 
in which they sought a building permit has no effect 
on the jurisdiction of the Board of Adjust menl !o de-
r'uh Mir building permit question. 
C O N C L U S I O N " 
Protection ol tlie naiurai resources in our canyons 
is f vital importance to the health, safety and welfare 
of e . e n resident in this valley, including" property 
owners in the ranvon. Almoxj nothing ei-u!d more di-
rectly relate t«. !hc health safety and welfare of the 
!
" Mian the protection of the watershed. This alone 
• i be sufficient to justify the reasonableness of the 
\s - h n • ^ !hr -'-anvons. However, the evidence 
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showed there are numerous other conisderations that 
support the zoning plan. Slope, avalanches, erosion and 
landslides make a great majority of property in the 
canyons undevelopable at all. Lack of sewer and water, 
access, police and fire protection make high density de-
velopment of the Albion Basin undesirable. The beauty 
of the canyons is an asset to this community which must 
be protected for all to enjoy. This does not mean public 
use of private property but only that private develop-
ment in the canyons be limited and controlled so as not 
destroy this beauty. This is what the canyon zoning 
plan attempts to do. 
Our legislature specifically mentions the protection 
of the health, safety and welfare of the "future inhabi-
tants" of the state as well as the present inhabitants as 
one of the proper aims of zoning. In our canyons, more 
than anywhere else in the state, proper land use plan-
ning today is essential to protect the welfare of our 
children and grandchildren. The canyon zoning plan, 
as applied to the appellants' property in the canyon, 
allows them the right to build an extensive single family 
residential development on all their lots in the Albion 
Basin regardless of the size of such lots. On their 
property in the Albion Basin zoned F- l they may de-
velop any parcel over one acre for any uses allowed 
in the F R zoning. On their other property in the 
canyons which is zoned FR-50, most of which is unde-
velopable at all, they may develop any parcels over 50 
acres, many of which appellants own, for any of the 
uses allowed in the FR-50 zoning. On any parcels under 
32 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
50 acres they may develop a single family home. \\ ;.- u 
weighed against the numerous essential considerations 
supporting the need for this zoning in the canyons, this 
regulation of use does not support appellant allegations 
that their land has been takrn without compensation. 
For the reasons s t auu m ii«-«t i ^po i^um^ -.VIH-HI 
suhinil Hi* dcri^n*- -*" M».. 1MU*M .-oiirt should be sus-
t;im< ; . ' 
Respectfully sul.ii.uw .i, 
R . P A U L V A ^ D A M 
Salt Lake County Al tn ims 
J O H I N *• \ \ K h \ 
Chief f >\ il Denntv County Attorney 
KE'JST S. LEAVIS 
Deputy Salt T,ak-" 0*unt . .:rt-».:t. < 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents, Sali Lak-1 C o u n n . > * d. 
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